University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 9

May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM

Issues in conductive argument weight
Thomas Fischer
University of Houston Downtown

Rongdong Jin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Fischer, Thomas and Jin, Rongdong, "Issues in conductive argument weight" (2011). OSSA Conference
Archive. 50.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/50

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Issues in conductive argument weight
THOMAS FISCHER
Department of Philosophy
University of Houston Downtown
One Main Street
Houston, TX 77002
fischert@uhd.edu

ABSTRACT: The concept of conductive argument weight was developed by Carl Wellman and later by
Trudy Govier. This concept has received renewed attention recently from another informal logician, Robert
C. Pinto. Argument weight has also been addressed in recent years by theorists in AI & Law. I argue from a
non-technical perspective that some aspects of AI & Law’s approach to argument weight can be usefully
applied to the issues addressed by Pinto. I also relate some of these issues to the work of argument theorist
Harald Wohlrapp.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Talk of weighing reasons and arguments pro and con is often heard in everyday speech.
The relevant dictionary definition of ‘weigh’ is, according to dictionary.com, “to evaluate
in the mind; to consider carefully in order to reach an opinion, decision, or choice: to
weigh the facts; to weigh a proposal.” Argument theorists use the concept of argument
weight in this quite general process sense of the term. For instance, Douglas Walton
(2010: 18) comments regarding a specific legal case that “This context includes a sequence of argumentation relevant to that issue that is intended to resolve it by weighing
the arguments on both sides.” Talk of argument weighing in this general ‘process’ sense
has few if any theoretical consequences and as such is not controversial. What is at issue
in theory of argument, and has been for at least four decades, is whether there are more
specific theoretical concepts, tools, methods, and insights that pertain to the concept of
argument weight and the norms of argument evaluation.
A related concept to that of argument weight is argument sufficiency, the third of
informal logic’s ‘evaluation’ triad of Acceptability Relevance, and Sufficiency, or ARS.
Given its importance, it seems to me that the concept of argument weight has historically
received comparatively little attention in theory of argument. According to Ralph Johnson, the same is true with respect to the concept of argument sufficiency: “Almost no
work has been done by informal logicians on this [sufficiency] criterion.” (2000: 204)
Although Johnson’s statement is partly based on Hans Hansen’s survey of 1990, it seems
to me that there is some truth in his statement even today. It is a working assumption of
the present paper that argument weight is a major aspect of argument sufficiency, although I shall neither presume nor argue that the terms ‘weight’ and ‘sufficiency’ are synonymous in theory of argument. I hope that addressing the concept of argument weight
will help to clarify and advance the theory of argument sufficiency.
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The concept of argument weight has been developed with respect to conductive
arguments principally by theorists Carl Wellman and Trudy Govier. We shall address in
Section 2 some issues involving the definition of ‘conductive’, but for now we can provisionally understand conductive arguments as ‘pro and con’ arguments. Wellman famously wrote in his groundbreaking Challenge and Response (1971: 82) that we weigh reasons
by a “repeated thinking through”. As has been frequently noted, Wellman’s statement is
not very helpful and suggests that no useful theory of argument weight can be developed.
Some theorists, for example Harald Wohlrapp (2008: 333), have argued at length that the
concept of argument weight is not useful in theory of argument. While Trudy Govier (1999:
170) has developed an interesting list of guidelines for conductive argument evaluation, she
has also stated (1999: 172) that the putative method for conductive evaluation is “a complex
one requiring imagination and sensitive judgment, and open to dispute at many points.”
Other than Govier, one of the few philosophers who has addressed the subject of
argument weight in recent years is Robert C. Pinto. In his (2010), Pinto initially summarizes and then critiques the work of both Wellman and Govier. He then develops his own
account of how the concept of argument weight—and also the concepts of argument
strength or force—should be understood in contemporary theory of argument. I argue in
the present paper that (1) Pinto is heading in the right direction on argument weight, and
that (2) efforts in the area of artificial intelligence and law provide material that is useful
for addressing and extending Pinto’s account. Pinto (2010: 22) describes his theory of
argument weight and strength as “very preliminary”.
It should be noted that the material in AI that I find relevant to the present paper
was mostly or entirely developed prior to 2010, the date of Pinto’s recent paper on argument weight. The quantity of discourse between AI and non-technical theorists of argument seems to have been slim historically, with the exception of the work of Douglas
Walton and perhaps of a few others. The present paper will have achieved much of its
purpose if it helps engender a wider discussion of issues in the topic area of argument
weight between AI theorists and the broader argument theory community.
The field of artificial intelligence is very large, daunting in its technical complexity, and currently dynamic. I make no presumption to assess its goals and methods
here, partly because I lack the technical background required to do so. Fortunately, many
articles in AI & Law are somewhat accessible to non-computer-scientists in terms of the
general ideas presented.
From a non-technical theorist’s perspective, AI & Law has the great intrinsic
virtue of being required by its own methodology to continually address real-word complexity in arguments and argumentation. In comparing informal logic with AI, the parable
of the blind men and the elephant comes to mind. One blind man grasping only the elephant’s ear says an elephant is very much like a leaf; the blind man grasping only one leg
of the elephant states that an elephant is very much like a tree trunk, and so on. The point
of the parable here is that non-technical argument theorists tend to work with comparatively short and compact arguments, whereas argument theorists in AI typically address
extremely complex extended arguments, e.g. all past argued cases relevant to some current case. Another difference is that while informal logicians intensively analyze alternative and nuanced interpretations of natural language expressions, AI theorists apply computer-friendly symbology within an approach that may even abstract from all argument
content whatsoever (which can give non-technical argument theorists great pause). In
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short, the approaches to argument and argumentation by informal logic and AI are at opposite poles in several key respects. More collaboration between the two quite different
approaches to theory of argument could be fruitful. However, collaboration can be a
tricky business, and some errors and shortcomings in understandings seem almost inevitable. The present paper is surely no exception to that generality.
On the side of non-technical theory of argument, I shall focus principally on
Pinto’s recent paper and thus indirectly on Wellman and Govier. At several places, I will
also suggest how my findings might apply to the work of argument theorist Harald Wohlrapp. Most of Wohlrapp’s major work, Der Begriff des Arguments, remains untranslated
into English, so all my claims in the present paper regarding his work are quite tentative.
On the AI side, I shall address principally the work of several theorists who happen to
have a past or present affiliation with the University of Liverpool’s Department of Computer Science. This group of theorists includes Trevor Bench-Capon, Paul E. Dunne,
Katie Atkinson, and Alison Chorley. Giovanni Sartor and others not at Liverpool have
been co-authors with Bench-Capon. Dunne and others have very recently published in
Artificial Intelligence an article titled “Weighted argument systems: Basic Definitions,
algorithms, and complexity results.” (2011) We shall address some less technical aspects
of this article in Section Four.
Although Bench-Capon has published widely in many areas of AI, I shall be
particularly focusing on his theory of case-based, value-based reasoning (VCBR). Chorley’s dissertation at Liverpool is explicitly an explication, critique, and testing of BenchCapon’s value-based, case-based reasoning. The work of Bench-Capon, Chorley, and
others will be addressed in terms of its non-technical claims and presuppositions and not
in terms of any of any proofs or software-specific issues. There are a number of other
major AI & Law theorists whose work is relevant in the present paper, but addressing
their ideas would extend the present paper to an unacceptable length. This list of other
important AI & Law theorists includes, but is not limited to: Vincent Aleven (2010), Karl
Ashley (2002, 2004), Henry Prakken (2009) with Bench-Capon, Japp Hage (2004), Edwina Rissland (2002, 2006) with Kevin Ashley, and Bram Roth and Bart Verheij (2004).
Quite a few of these AI theorists do not explicitly use the term “argument weight”, at
least not frequently; so some interpretation on my part is involved here.
We shall find that a major connecting theme between argument weight, informal
logic, and AI is that of feature weight. For instance, Robert C. Pinto on the informal logic
side addresses argument weight in conductive arguments using the concepts of feature
importance and degree of feature presence. In AI & Law, the term ‘feature’ is key to the
central theoretical constructs of factors and dimensions. Douglas Walton, whose work
spans AI & Law and informal logic, employs the concepts of dimensions and factors in
addressing the evaluation of analogical arguments; and, as we shall see, factors have features as a key component:
To comparatively weigh up the strength of the one argument as compared to the strength of
the opposed argument, we have to bring in something like dimensions or factors that identify
the respects in which one case is similar to the other, and have some device for estimating
how similar one is to the other by attaching weights to similarity. (Walton, 2010: 7)

An important initial question is how and in what sense the concept of feature weight can
be used univocally with respect to both analogical and conductive arguments. A short and

3

THOMAS FISCHER

preliminary answer is that rational determination of weight involves an evaluation argument and that there are substantial resemblances between the evaluation arguments regarding both analogical and conductive arguments. One such resemblance is the concept
of feature weight. In contrast, evaluations of deductive and inductive arguments seem to
not involve feature weight, except perhaps in the sense put forward by Frank Zenker
(2010) that deductive and inductive arguments can be classified as having equal weights
and thus no comparative weight.
The present account does not presume that the rational determination of argument weight of a conductive argument can itself involve only conductive types of arguments. In my view, rational determination of the comparative weight of individual conductive main argument considerations (argument strands) could involve for example analogical and/or enumeratively inductive arguments. Even if Wellman’s definition of conductive arguments as case-based is granted, the single case involves the main (conductive) argument, whereas potentially multiple cases can be addressed in non-conductive
subarguments supporting individual conductive considerations in terms of their comparative weight. If the determination of conductive weight is to be rational rather than ‘intuitive’ or ‘mechanical’, it is at least initially plausible that a variety of argument types
might be employed. Of course, what rational determination of ‘weight’ means is a principal issue to be addressed in the present account.
It should be noted that Trudy Govier may not think that all conductive arguments are case-based, but this dispute may hinge on a perhaps defeasible technical definition of case. If the concept of case is understood broadly enough to encompass, for example, ‘the case of Newton’s physics verses Einstein’s physics’, then perhaps we could
classify all conductive arguments as case-based, although Govier might still disagree. In
this quite broad interpretation of the word ‘case’, the specificity implied involves something like ‘a single focus of a chain of reasoning’ rather than ‘concrete’ circumstances in
some way. In addressing Pinto’s ideas in the next section, we shall also attempt to further
clarify the term ‘conductive’, which has somewhat distinct meanings for Wellman, Govier, and Pinto.
2. R. C. PINTO ON CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT WEIGHT
The appropriate definition of “conductive” has not yet been agreed to among theorists of argument; many argument theorists choose not to use the term at all. We shall not attempt here
to resolve issues regarding the proper definition of “conductive argument”, since argument
typology seems to be a quicksand area. However, it will be helpful at this point to briefly
review the general meaning of term and some of the definitional issues surrounding it.
Wellman (1971) originally distinguished three subtypes of conductive argument
as follows: Type One with a single pro reason, Type Two with multiple pro reasons; and
Type Three with at least one pro reason and at least one con reason. For present purposes, we shall treat Wellman’s Type Three ‘pro and con’ argument as paradigmatic for conductive arguments in general. In other words, we will treat the basic conductive argument
scheme as having potentially multiple pro and multiple con reasons. This means that
Wellman’s Types One and Two conductive arguments are understood as limitations on
the provisionally paradigmatic ‘pro and con’ Type Three scheme. We shall not particular-
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ly address the appropriateness of talking of a reason against a given conclusion, sometimes called an anti-reason.
In his (2010), Pinto concurs in many important respects with Wellman and Govier on the nature of conductive arguments (hereafter generally understood as ‘pro and
con’ arguments). Some main aspects of Pinto’s position on conductive arguments are as
follows; the wording is my interpretation except for the material in quotes:





All are convergent in structure with independent main reasons.
An individual reason can provide only non-conclusive support for its conclusion.
Weighing pros and cons involves “pitting the combined force of the pros against
the combined force of the cons.” (2010: 5)
A pro consideration outweighs a con consideration “by neutralizing or mollifying the strength or force which the counter-considerations have to undermine the
conclusions.” (2010: 6)

Pinto quotes Wellman that pro and con reasons “do not always occur ‘neatly in pairs’”,
Pinto then points out the implication in Wellman that pro and con reasons sometimes do
occur neatly in pairs.
Using quite a few of Govier’s own examples of conductive argument, Pinto argues, seemingly against Govier, that the various independent reason strands in a conductive argument can be nonconductive in type, e.g. inductive generalizations or an inductive
analogies. Thus for Pinto, classifying an argument as conductive requires that what is
usually called the main argument be convergent in structure; but the reasons making up
that structure that are weighed against each other may be of diverse types. Pinto (2010:
3) notes in a footnote that Govier should distinguish “between reasons and the propositions or premisses that make up those reasons” and say that “if a conductive argument
contains several reasons in support of its conclusion, each of those reasons provides nonconclusive support of the conclusion, and does so independently of the other reasons.”
(Italics original) As I understand Pinto, an individual reason can be, and frequently is, an
inductive or analogical subargument.
A requirement for all theorists of conductive argument that no individual reason
in a conductive argument provides deductive support to the main conclusion, which
would of course make all but one reason strand superfluous after interpretation. Apparently for Pinto, an individual reason providing conclusive deductive support could be a
single premise, as with an immediate deductive inference; or the individual reason could
be provided by two premises in a linked, dependent support relationship. I, for one, find
myself in broad concurrence with Pinto’s views and distinctions here.
Pinto (2010: 15) claims that Govier’s concept of assessing argument weight using ceteris paribus clauses is ultimately not useful. He argues that Govier’s exceptions
are themselves counterconsiderations that require comparative weight assignment. Quoting Pinto (2010: 15): “In short, we can identify ’exceptions’ to a qualified generalization
only if we are already able to compare the strength of arguments licensed by that generalization to certain other arguments.”
In discussing a conductive argument example from Frank Zenker, Pinto (2010:
6) describes one con consideration as a diminisher, in Pollock’s terms, of the paired pro
consideration. Contra Pollock, Pinto does not believe that a numerical degree of strength
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can be assigned to every argument. Pinto’s position (2010: 13) is instead that “the best we
can hope for is to make judgments about the comparative force or strength of individual
considerations or sets of considerations.” (Italics original) Addressing Pollock’s views
with any degree of adequacy is not feasible here. My impression is that Pollock’s approach, with his scientific and mathematical background, emphasizes arguments involving factual issues to the neglect of arguments involving values; whereas Wellman focused
on value issues to the neglect of arguments involving facts.
In his own outline of a theory of conductive argument weight, Pinto begins with
the concept of open-textured predicates. Pinto says he finds this concept described in
Wellman, but not under that name:
The three characteristics Wellman ascribes to predicates exhibiting open texture, namely
(1) there are several criteria for application of the term
(2) the criteria can be satisfied to a greater or lesser degree
(3) the criteria may vary in importance
also apply, I think, to the “good-making” or “right-making” characteristics on which we base
our ethical or moral appraisals.
It is tempting to think, therefore, that what gives rise to the need to assess relative
strength (in the sense of weight) of pro and con considerations in conductive arguments is
rooted in the fact that the conclusions of arguments involve the application of predicates
(normative and/or descriptive) whose applications are based on criteria or “features” exhibiting these three characteristics. (2010: 17-18)

Pinto claims that most of the ten examples of conductive arguments collected from Govier’s work involve open-textured predicates.
Given the above critiques and distinctions, Pinto is ready to define weight as a
technical term in theory of argument:
The weight of a consideration would be a function of (a) the extent or degree to which a criterion has been satisfied and (b) the importance of that criterion. And the overall force of any
consideration would be a function of the weight of the consideration and the risk involved in
relying on that consideration. (2010: 18)

To illustrate what he means by risk, Pinto mentions (2010: 24) Steve Patterson’s example
of deciding the pros and cons of taking one’s snake-bitten child to a hospital immediately,
given that the snake’s bite was very likely non-poisonous. The consequences of not treating a poisonous bite could be the death of the child. Reasoning with a combination of the
probabilities and the utilities of alternative outcomes is quite familiar in decision theory.
Pinto’s distinguishing (1) argument risk from (2) argument weight is an interesting theoretical move that could turn out to be fruitful. I find it difficult to readily accept
Pinto’s account on this point. We commonly talk of ‘weighing the consequences’ of an
action. The possibility of the child’s death is seemingly a consideration in itself. It could
be that risk in Pinto’s sense of the term is important for assessing only some kinds of
conductive arguments, perhaps predominantly those in practical reasoning. For present
purposes, I shall in any case table issues involving the technical terms strength (or force)
and risk in Pinto’s paper and move on to Pinto’s theory of argument weight.
In a section titled ‘Comparing the force of a single pro consideration to a single
counterconsideration’, Pinto states that we compare the importance of features in conductive evaluations as follows:
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Let F1 be the feature on which one of those two considerations turns and F2 the feature on
which the other consideration turns. If we prefer a situation which has F1 but not F2 to a situation that has F2 but not F1, then we judge the consideration which turns on F1 to be of
greater importance than the consideration that turns on F2. (2010: 21)

In Pinto’s account (2010: 22), normative features have degrees of preference. Pinto’s
examples of such degrees include “just a bit”, “a fair amount”, “to a great extent”. The
comparative importance of a feature is determined, according to Pinto (2010: 19) by our
preferring a situation with the feature to one without the feature. This sounds to me similar to Pollock’s ‘situation likings’, but there may be some important differences that
would be uncovered in a closer analysis.
In what he describes as a “very preliminary proposal” (2010: 22), Pinto introduces the concept of degree of feature presence as follows:
Let D1 be the degree to which feature F1 is present and D2 be the degree to which F2 is present. In determining whether we prefer situations which have F1 but not F2, etc., we determine whether—other things being equal—we prefer F1 in degree D1 to F2. If we do, then we
count the consideration that turns on F1 in degree D1 to have greater weight than the consideration that turns on F2 in degree D2. The greater the “extent to which we prefer one combination to the other” (e.g. “just a bit”, “a fair amount”, or “to a great extent”) , the greater the
relative weight we accord to that set of considerations in comparison with the other set of
considerations (“slightly more weight”, “moderately more weight”, or “considerably more
weight. (Pinto 2010: 22)

Pinto in effect is ranking relevant feature instances by their comparative quantity in some
respect. A good paradigm case might be considering the feature of a salary raise in a job
offer. The idea is that the salary component carries increasing argument weight with progressively higher level salary offers. This feature could be characterized as ‘the more the
better’, but other types of arguments might maximize weight in terms of a middle ground
or even of a minimum quantity, e.g. with spousal stress levels involved in moving to an
alternative job. While the degree of spousal stress involved would have to be assessed,
estimations of the degree of the feature would take place within a value ranking of spousal welfare verses income and career maximization. These value rankings would seemingly be Pinto’s ‘importance’ factor. Pinto seems to identify ‘preference’ and ‘importance’ in
this theory context.
So far so good, but we have of course not yet come very far. For example, we
need to ask how argument weight would work with a more complex array of features and
with multiple interacting values. Reality consists of situations with typically complex
feature packages. Pinto acknowledges (2010: 24) that he is “not at all confident” that his
account of weight and risk can serve to assess argument force (or strength) when “large
sets of considerations are at stake”.
A number of argument theorists in AI & Law have attempted to develop theoretical constructs that are applicable to extended arguments and dialogues with large sets of
considerations. Some of these constructs, most specifically those called extended argumentation frameworks, also involve assessing argument weight, although not always employing exactly that term. One example of an extended argumentation framework is Trevor Bench-Capon’s (and others’) value-based, cased-based reasoning (VCBR). In later
sections, we address the general concept of extended argumentation frameworks from a
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non-technical perspective and try to see what light they might cast on issues of conductive weight as understood in informal logic.
Before presenting Bench-Capon’s theories in more detail, it will be helpful here
to make a few limited characterizations of the AI approach in theory of argument, focusing primarily on AI & Law and case-based reasoning. Case-based reasoning in AI and
Law involves developing theories of the case. In the practice of law, a theory of the case
can be used to explain the precedent cases, to justify a judgment in the present or current
case, and to predict a pending judgment on the current case and, in a sense, on all future
relevantly similar cases. A lawyer’s closing argument in a trial is commonly called ‘presenting the theory of the case’.
From an informal logician’s point of view, this mixing of explanatory, justificatory, and predictive purposes appears conceptually suspect; and admittedly there are serious issues at play here. On the other hand, the concept of argument weight has proved so
resistant to theory for so many years that striking off in an uncertain but potentially valuable new direction has a kind of general pragmatic warrant.
Another objection to the present direction of inquiry might be that legal cases are
principally addressed by analogical argument schemes and that AI theorists are basically
just chaining analogical arguments in their computer applications. It might be held that
addressing a large number of such schemes in one extended argument is a useful technical device that nevertheless has little or no deep import for theory of argument. While
this could turn out to be the case, it seems to me that case-based reasoning in AI could be
more complex than is reflected by the idea of just chaining analogical schemes. Douglas
Walton (2005: 144) has written that the problem of “how to analyze the precise relationship that holds between CBR [case-based reasoning] on the one hand and, and argumentation schemes and diagrams on the other…has not, so far, been studied in argumentation.” This area of study may turn out to be a very fruitful one, and we obviously should
not assume one outcome or the other at this time.
We turn to the work of Trevor Bench-Capon and others in the next section. I
shall also be suggesting that much of Bench-Capon’s work might be generalizable to the
theory of everyday reasoning, argument, and argumentation.
3. BENCH-CAPON’S VALUE-BASED, CASE-BASED REASONING
Much of the present section is designed for those who are not already familiar with the
more prominent literature of AI & Law. We shall work mostly with a very widely discussed theory of the case in Trevor Bench-Capon’s work, the ‘hunting wild animals cases’. For a succinct account of the three cases in the ‘hunting wild animals’ theory of the
case, we could do no better than to quote Douglas Walton’s summary (2005: 145):
In all three cases, the plaintiff (P) was chasing wild animals, and the defendant (D) interrupted the chase, preventing P from capturing those animals. The issue to be decided is whether
or not P has a legal remedy (a right to be compensated for the loss of the game) against D. In
the fox case, Pierson vs. Post, P was hunting a fox on open land in the traditional manner using horse and hound, when D killed and carried off the fox. In this case, P was held to have
no right to the fox because he had gained no possession of it. In the ducks case, Keeble v
Hickeringill, P owned a pond and made his living by luring wild ducks there with decoys,
shooting them, and selling them for food. Out of malice, D used guns to scare the ducks away
form the pond. Here P won. In the fish case, Young v Hitchins, both parties were commercial
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fishermen, While P was closing his nets, D speed into the gap, spread his own net, and caught
the fish. In this case D won.

The Young case involving fish is the current (or ‘problem’) case that is not yet decided.
The Pierson case involving the fox and the Keeble case involving ducks are alreadydecided cases that function as precedent cases in the ‘hunting wild animals’ example.
In case-based reasoning (CBR), relevant cases are initially characterized by their
relevant features. The general concept of relevance here deserves more attention than we
will be able to provide here. We shall only lightly touch on issues regarding the language
used in feature descriptions, e.g. the category structure applied in terms of levels of abstraction chosen for the description.
In Bench-Capon’s account (2003), a feature becomes a component of a factor
when the feature becomes the antecedent of a rule expressed as a conditional; the consequent of that rule is the outcome favored by that particular feature. For example, if a feature of a case is that the plaintiff did not at any point in the events described possess the
hunted and disputed wild animal, then that feature would favor the defendant. The net
effect of converting features to factors is, in the language of conductive argument theorists, sorting features into pros and cons for a given case.
As an example of a factor for Bench-Capon, we can start with the feature of pursuing one’s own livelihood. If the plaintiff was pursuing his own livelihood during the
incident in question, then the rule would be: ‘If the plaintiff was pursuing his own livelihood, then find for the plaintiff.” In Bench-Capon’s computer-oriented nomenclature,
which we shall largely not use, the rule would be ‘If pLiv, then P’ where ‘P’ means ‘find
for the plaintiff’. Another potential factor would be: “If the defendant was pursuing his
own livelihood, then find for the defendant,” i.e. in Bench-Capons method “If dLiv, then
D’. Below, I will use F-1, F-2, etc. for feature designations, and V-1, V-2, etc. will be
used later for value designations. This is closer to Alison Chorley’s conventions than
Bench-Capon’s. My account above skips over some technical details and formulations
that are seemingly not key for the present inquiry.
The following summary, which is of my own construction, is intended to present
most of the main points of Bench-Capon’s system as applied to the ‘hunting wild animals’ case. The meaning of these terms will hopefully become clearer after we consider a
sample theory of the case.









A factor is a feature that is antecedent of a rule, with the consequent being the
outcome favored by that feature. [Example: if the plaintiff is not in possession of
the hunted animal in dispute, then decide for the defendant.’]
Each factor promotes a value. [Example: The factor of owning the land where
the hunt takes place promotes the value of the enjoyment of property rights.]
Each rule promotes the value associated with its factor.
Rules are prioritized, i.e. are in a rank order such that each rule defeats all lower
ranking rules.
Each rule potentially defeats all subsequent rules in the prioritized list.
A rule that is not defeated by any other rule explains the outcome of a case.
A new rule preference may be established from the outcome of a decided case.
A new value preference may be derived from a newly established rule preference.
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A new rule preference may be derived from an established value preference.

Rule preferences and value preferences are rankings. A ranking could be regarded as the precursor of weighting or even as the first level of weighting in the sense that
each rule outweighs all lower rules in that same list, etc. We shall address adding numerical weightings to rankings shortly in the work of Alison Chorley. It should be noted that
Bench-Capon himself seems to rarely use the term ‘weight’ or its cognates.
For the case above described by Walton from Bench-Capon, we would have the
following factors:





F-1: The plaintiff was pursuing his own livelihood at the place and time of the
disputed incident, so find for the plaintiff.
F-2: The plaintiff owned the land on which the disputed hunting incident took
place, so find for the plaintiff.
F-3: The plaintiff did not at any point possess the hunted animal in the dispute,
so find for the defendant.
F-4: The defendant was pursuing his own livelihood at the place and time of the
disputed incident, so find for the defendant.

Now we can take a look at the construction of a theory of the case using the example of
Theory 4b in Bench-Capon’s account (2003: 112).
The first step in building a theory of the case is constructing the case descriptions of all cases involved. Below, the current, undecided case is in large caps; the precedent cases are not in large caps. In the right-most column are the case outcomes, either P
for plaintiff or D for defendant. Note that the current, undecided case is listed twice in
order to display both potential outcomes, ‘P’ and ‘D’. The asterisk in the grid indicates
the presence of a pro factor in the case; and number sign indicates the presence of a con
factor in the case. The table and designations are of my own construction and are designed to assist non-technical readers.
Case Name
Pierson
Keeble
YOUNG
YOUNG

F-1
(pro-P)

F-2
(pro-P)

*
*
*

*

F-3
(pro-D)
#
#
#
#

F-4
(pro-D)

#
#

Case
Outcome
D
P
P
D

Table 1
In Bench-Capon’s system, a factor supports a value. Values in legal contexts for BenchCapon are commonly understood as social values which have roles in justifying positive
laws. Using my examples based on Walton’s account of Bench-Capon, we have the following value-support relationships:
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Feature (Factor)Present
Pursuing one’s own livelihood
(F-1, F-4)

Social Value Promoted
More social productivity
(V-1)

Owning the land on which
incident occurred (F-2)

Enjoyment of property
rights (V-2)

Not being in possession of the
animal (F-3)

Less litigation (clearer
laws)
(V-3)

Table 2
Theory 4b of the case in Bench-Capon’s account (2003: 112) is portrayed in the grid below, which uses display conventions of my own construction. The theory supports (‘explains’) finding for the defendant, so the line with YOUNG being found for the plaintiff
drops out (greyed out), a detail which seems to me helpful for less technical readers but
does not appear in Bench-Capon’s paper. Note that F-2 is shaded out, another graphic
move of my own invention, because it is not applied in this particular theory. For additional theories of the case including Theories 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b, see Bench-Capon’s
account. Here is this theory of the case presented in a grid and then in words, both being
my constructions:
Case Name
Pierson
Keeble
YOUNG
YOUNG

F-1
(pro-P)

F-2
(pro-P)

*
*
*

*

F-3
(pro-D)
#
#
#
#

F-4
(pro-D)
#
#

Case
Outcome
D
P
P
D

Table 3
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Rule preference established by the Keeble case outcome: F-1 is prior to F-3.
Rule creation: Merge primitive rules F3 and F4 into one rule: F3 and F4
Add an ‘arbitrary’ value (see below): V-3 and V-1 merged is prior to V-1.
Create a rule preference from the above value preference: F3 and F4 merged is
prior to F1. F-4 is substituted for the first occurrence of V-1, and F-1 is substituted for the second occurrence of V-1, since V-1 is supported by both.

The rule in the fourth line of the above account is said to explain the D outcome in the
Young case. The logic of Bench-Capon’s account is that F-3 and F-1 are each defeated;
the merged F 3 and F4 rule is undefeated. Bench-Capon lists one other value preference
in this case, V1 prior to V3, derived from rule preference F-1 prior to F3. Combining the
two value preferences yields an ordering on values: (V-3 and V-4) > V-1 >V-3.
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The term “arbitrary” in line three is in this context a technical term indicating
that the preference in question is not derived from another case. However, the inference
on line 3 above is not arbitrary in the everyday sense of that term. Line three above is
based on a defeasible presumption that adding a new value to an existing value increases
the net value—i.e. that achieving two positive values is superior to achieving only one of
those two values, unless there are exceptions involving value conflicts. As Pinto mentioned (2010: 23), one may prefer chocolate ice cream and also vanilla in that order,
while rejecting the two together in one bowl.
As illustrated above in Bench-Capon’s account, a precedent case or set of cases
establishes values which may in turn be applied to new cases. Some of the new cases may
be precedent-setting and thus alter, in large or small ways, the established value preference
(ordering/weighting) and thus the deciding of additional new cases. Thus cases and values
are in a dynamic two-way, dialectical interchange. (Ashley, 2004) It seems to me that values themselves are not typically characterized in any kind of meaningful compendium, so it
seems to me fair to say that the record of cases and their outcomes—using ‘cases’ in the
most general and wide sense of the term—is the most accessible complete record of a society’s values. We will touch on this point again in section five of the present paper.
A chief value Bench-Capon’s approach is its scalability to complex arguments
involving multiple features and values and cases. His theory of the case 4b as described
above is fairly short and uncomplicated, so one might ask in what sense does it represent
any theoretical advance. I think the short answer is that the same systematic approach is
applicable to contexts involving a large number of relevant cases. As such, it may function as a theoretical model for some important aspects of general reasoning. If so, such a
model might also serve to significantly clarify some important normative issues in the
general theory of argument.
Our understanding of Bench-Capon’s system of value-based case-based reasoning, as well as its applicability to Pinto’s work on argument weight, can be further developed by looking at an evaluation and test of Bench-Capon’s system in a dissertation by
one of his students, Alison Chorley. In the present paper, we can address only a small
fragment of Chorley’s analyses and findings in her dissertation. Bench-Capon has himself
further addressed his theory of values and cases in his (2000), (2001), (2003) and (2009),
possibly among others.
Whereas Bench-Capon’s value-based, case-based reasoning (VCBR) ranks factors, the specific aspect of Chorley’s account which we shall address here also sorts factors into dimensions. The concept of dimension had previously appeared in various forms
in the work of a number of theorists including Rissland and Ashley (2002). Dimensions
are prominent in HYPO software where ‘dimension’ means approximately ‘issue’ or ‘issue area’, according to Chorley. In describing the HYPO understanding of dimension,
Chorley writes (2006: 65) that a dimension “can be seen as a collection of factors which
all relate to a given issue”. For instance, if a company were suing for damages due to its
trade secrets having been revealed by another party, then a high level of security
measures having been taken by the company with information to protect would be a factor favoring that company’s case. However, a low or negligible level of security regarding trade secrets would favour the defendant’s claim that they acquired the trade secret
through legal means. In the same context of suing regarding trade secrets, Disclosure-ina-Public Forum by the plaintiff would be an extremely strong pro-defendant factor, since
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many outside parties could have learned the trade secrets through legal means. On the
other hand, Disclosure-to-some-Outsiders would be a much weaker pro-defendant factor,
since many companies protecting their trade secrets often must selectively disclose them
to some outsiders in the normal course of business. These examples will hopefully become clearer after we consider below a list of factors and dimensions in Chorley’s account.
Whereas dimensions in HYPO are understood as defined by issues, Chorley understands the concept of dimension as intrinsically involving a value (2006: 66):
This similarity of values to dimensions is the basis of the extension to values described by
Bench-Capon and Sartor in [10], and we will follow their account and arrange our factors according to the extent to which they promote the value to which they relate. For example, F10Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders and F27-Disclosure-in-Public-Forum can be seen as points on the
social value scale of taking Reasonable Efforts, with F27-Disclosure-in-Public-Forum being
stronger than F10-Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders. In making this move, however, I am departing
considerably from the HYPO conception of dimension, and changing the focus from how the
facts of a case are represented to a measure of the contribution to an issue made by a factor.

In “changing the focus” to “the contribution to an issue made by a factor”, Chorley appears to be linking factors to importance or values in somewhat the same general way as
we saw Pinto do in his (2010), as referenced above.
Below is one of Chorley’s tables displaying five dimensions with multiple factors per dimension; all the dimensions are in the domain of trade secrets law. The classifications “Normal”, “Weak”, and “Knock-out” are weightings from the IBP model which
Chorley describes (2006: 59) as “a predictive program based on CATO.” “IBP” stands
for “Issue-based Prediction” and is explained and evaluated by Bruninghaus and Ashley
(2003). In this table, each italicized heading is an issue and, for Chorley, a value.
Confidentiality Agreement Type (CA)
F4 Agreed Not To Disclose (p)
F5 Agreement Not Specific (d)
F13 Non Competition Agreement (p)
F21 Knew Info Confidential (p)
F23 Waiver Of Confidentiality (d) l

Normal
Normal
Normal
Normal
Normal

Reasonable Efforts Type (RE)
F1 Disclosure In Negotiations (d)
F6 Security Measures (p)
F10 Secrets Disclosed Outsiders (d)
F12 Outsider Disclosures Restricted (p)
F19 No Security Measures (d)
F27 Disclosure In Public Forum (d)

Weak
Normal
Weak
Normal
KO
KO

Legitimate Means Type (LM)
F3 Employee Sole Developer (d)
F11 Vertical Knowledge (d)
F15 Unique Product (p)
F16 Info Reverse Engineerable (d)
F17 Info Independently Generated (d)
F20 Info Known To Competitors (d)

Normal
Normal
Normal
Weak
Normal
KO
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F24 Info Obtainable Elsewhere (d)
F25 Info Reverse Engineered (d)

Normal
Normal

Questionable Means Type (QM)
F2 Bribe Employee (p)
F7 Brought Tools (p)
F14 Restricted Materials Used (p)
F22 Invasive Techniques (p)
F26 Deception (p)

Normal
Normal
Normal
Normal
KO

Material Worth Type (MW)
F8 Competitive Advantage (p) KO
F18 Identical Products (p) Normal

KO
Normal

Table 4: Weak, normal and knock-out factors (Chorley 2006: Table 4.8)
You can see in the names of the dimensions above how they could be taken to encompass
both issues and values at the same time.
Of present interest to us Chorley’s is work on weighing dimensions and factors.
She writes:
“Each dimension, like each value, can have a different weight because some dimensions
might be considered more important than others. Also, because a dimension consists of a
range of points of differing strengths, the weight can be varied to give each point a different
portion of the dimension weight.” (2006: 67)

In other words, the approach here is that values are weighted, i.e. defined against each
other in terms of comparative importance, and then factors associated with each value are
in turn weighted in terms of the extent to which each supports its value. Chorley considers a number of other approaches, but this one is most pertinent to our present concerns.
The presumption that each factor supports only one value is implemented using
what Chorley calls simple dimensions; allowing a single factor to support multiple values
requires complex dimensions. Chorley discusses both versions of dimensions at length.
We shall confine ourselves to simple dimensions in the interest of brevity, although complex dimensions seem more adequate to the real world.
One of Chorley’s principal questions is: “Can we use the notion of dimensions to
produce a principled means of assigning weights to factors?” (2006: 67) Chorley runs a
number of experiments with both unweighted and weighted theories. Such experiments
can be developed based on a subset of past relevant cases and then tested by ‘retrodicting’
other past cases and, conceivably, predicting new cases. One of Chorley’s most important
findings is as follows:
When I used weights for the factors I found that the method which assigned weights according to where the factor appeared on the dimension performed the best, supporting the idea
that factors promote values to different degrees and that these factors can be ordered using
dimensions.” (2006: 47)

One of her methods was to assign numerical weights to dimensions (values) that had been
rank ordered by outcomes in case law. The value ranking she uses is, based on the initials
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in the value headings in her table 4.8 are: CA >LM > RE > (MW,QM). For the literal
meanings of each abbreviation, refer back to her Table 4.8 above, for example “RE”
meaning “Reasonable Efforts”. The ‘>’ symbol expresses rule priority. The value rankings are based on factor rankings which were derived from the relevant cases in casebased law. To assign numerical weights, she starts with assigning 0.1 to the least preferred values MW and QM. Then each higher value in term is assigned a number equal to
the double of the previous lower weight, plus 0.1. So this would give us 0.3 for RE, Reasonable Efforts. There is an unavoidable arbitrariness to initial numerical weight assignments, but the offsetting factor is that the theory is tested and the weightings are subject
to a rational process of confirmation.
Next Chorley creates a numerical scale for factors under each dimension. For
example, using the dimension or value weight of 0.3 for RE, Reasonable Efforts, the factor scale for that dimension is conceived of as twenty ‘slots’ ranging from 0.3 to -0.3. The
positive end of the spectrum is pro-plaintiff, and the negative end is pro-defendant.
Plaintiff End Weight

Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot

1
2
3 F6
4 F12
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.30
0.27
0.24
0.21
0.18
0.15
0.12
0.09
0.06
0.03

Defendant End Weight

Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot
Slot

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

F1
F10

F27
F19

-0.03
-0.06
-0.09
-0.12
-0.15
-0.18
-0.21
-0.24
-0.27
-0.3

Table 5: Dimension weighting for the Reasonable
Efforts Dimension (Chorley 2006: Table 5.9)
Based on a specific domain, and with admittedly a very limited amount of experimentation, Chorley found that the theoretical approach involving weighting factors within
weighted values performed the best compared both to other methods of weighting and to
unweighted theories.
The placement of various factors in the above table’s slots is based on nonnumerical weight quantity assignments derived from the IBP system’s work on precedent
cases. Factors F19 and F27 are knockout factors for the defence; F6 and F12 are normal factors for the plaintiff; and F1 and F10 are weak factors for the defence. It is very interesting to
compare these three IBP categories as applied by Chorley to the heretofore mentioned degrees of preference according to Pinto: “just a bit” [weak?], “a fair amount” [normal?], and
“to a great extent” [knockout?]. Bringing in numerical weights is admittedly problematic
because one faces an indefinitely large field of optional constructions; on the other hand, the
numbers do have some grounding in the verbal categories and also facilitate working with
complexity in a way that non-numerical quantity categories just cannot provide.
As noted, Pinto understands argument weight as based on the importance of a
feature and its degree of presence. I think there are at least two distinct respects in which
Chorley’s system could be viewed as an improvement on Pinto’s initial ideas (although
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Chorley’s work preceded Pinto’s). First, it develops Pinto’s account in that for her importance involves values which are themselves ranked and thus weighted in some way.
Second, Pinto’s degree of feature presence relates features to value/importance support,
but only for certain more quantitative features for which ‘more is better’. Chorley’s account, based in most respects on Bench-Capon’s, provides a more comprehensive approach to how features support values.
Hopefully the above account accurately provides the general flavour of BenchCapon’s and others’ value-based, case-based reasoning. Value-based, case-based reasoning in AI is one of a several extended argumentation frameworks (VAFS). These extended argumentation frameworks are extensions of abstract argumentation frameworks
(AAFs). In the next section, we shall try to further address Bench-Capon’s work by situating it within a group of several other extended argumentation frameworks as discussed in
a very recent article by Dunne on argument weight in AI.
4. AI’S EXTENDED ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS AND WEIGHTING
In their “Weighing argument systems: Basic definitions, algorithms, and complexity results” (2011), Paul E. Dunne et al develop a theory which is intended to subsume the four
different types of extended argumentation frameworks that have appeared thus far in AI.
Dunne is at the University of Liverpool’s Department of Computer Science along with
Bench-Capon, but the latter is not a co-author of this paper.
The four broad types of extended argument systems that Dunne et al examine
are as follows.





Preference-based argumentation frameworks (PAFS) of Amgoud and Cayrol;
Value-based argumentation frameworks (VAFS) of Bench-Capon;
Resolution-based argumentation frameworks (BAFS) of Baroni and Giacomin; and
Extended argumentation frameworks (EAFS) recently proposed and analyzed by
Modgil. (2011: 481)

Dunne (the ‘et al’ being assumed from here on) states that “all of the above frameworks
extend conventional argument models with weights that are attached to arguments. An
alternative—which we explore in the remainder of the present paper—is to attach weights
to the attacks between arguments.” (2011: 460)
All of these four frameworks are said to extend Dung’s concept of abstract argumentation frameworks (AAFs) as developed in his (1995). Dung’s paper is foundational for a great deal of subsequent work on AI in theory of argumentation. I cannot address
its highly technical aspects due to my lack of technical background. What is relevant to
us here is that all of the AAF extensions examined by Dunne in his (2011) are described
as involving issues of weighing. Before we can say much about extended argumentation
frameworks, it will be helpful for the sake of non-technical scholars like myself to briefly
address abstract argumentation frameworks in general.
The idea of an AAF sounds initially quite implausible to many non-technical
theorists of argument, in part because basic AAFs actually abstract from all argument
content. As Baroni and Giacomin express it (2009), AAFs involve “abstracting away
from the structure and meaning of arguments and attacks”. The only relationship among
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arguments in Dung’s original conception of 1995 is the attack relationship, which is
symbolized by an arrow from the attacking argument to the attacked argument. In AAFs,
all attacked arguments (claims in the context of argument) are presumptively successful,
unless the attacking claim is in turn attacked. If one argument is attacked by another, the
attacked argument is presumptively defeated, unless its attacker is in turn attacked by
another argument. There is thus an obvious sense in which AAFs provide one theoretical
interpretation of presumption-based argumentation.
An example might be helpful here. Let’s say that in an AAF two arguments are
symbolized as ‘a’ and ‘b’; a single arrow from ‘a’ to ‘b’ expresses ‘a attacks b’. So if we
add a new attack, ‘c attacks a’, to the first attack, then ‘a’ is defeated. Argument ‘b’ is
now undefeated because its defeater, ‘a’, was attacked; and ‘c’ is also undefeated because
it is not attacked. So the undefeated set of arguments from the original set would be composed of ‘b’ and ‘c’, which is called an ‘extension’ of the entire set. There are several
types of extensions which I should not try to characterize. Argument graphs for AAF’s
take each argument as a node and often show a great many attack relations in a cyclic
graph using arrow symbols and argument nodes. The effect for even fairly short argumentation sequences can be a visually off-putting ‘spaghetti bowl’ of arrowed lines.
What an AAF minimally accomplishes, in my ‘outsider’s’ formulation, is the
identification of all claims in a (typically) complex discourse that are acceptable in the
sense that they consistent with each other and not defeated (attacked) by another claim in
that discourse that is itself is not defeated (attacked). There are several levels of complexity here involving different types of ‘extensions’, i.e. argument sets; but it seems best here
to leave those distinction to technical specialists. Overall, the AAF analysis seems useful
for analyzing some complex dialogs with respect to internal consistency and structural
relationships among the arguments; its potential for expert knowledge systems, such as
medical diagnoses, and other intriguing applications is fairly clear.
The nature of the relevance of AAFs to the general normative theory of argument is a major theoretical issue in itself. It is widely recognized that, as Baroni and
Giacomin (2009: 26) put it, that “the gap between a practical problem and its representation as an abstract formalism is patently too wide and requires to be filled in by a less
abstract formalism”. Extended AAF’s such as Bench-Capon’s are designed, according to
my understanding, to address some widely recognized pragmatic and theoretical inadequacies of AAF’s.
In Dunne’s (2011), a quite generalized approach to argument weighting is developed which is intended to encompass the other four extended systems and go beyond
them in significant respects. Dunne (2011: 458) proposes an adjustable “inconsistency
budget” quantity for weighting. The inconsistency budget concept solves a major problem in AI in that there can be for some sets of argument more than one set of undefeated
arguments, which means the issue is undecided. Or, the outcome of abstract argument
framework analysis could be an empty of set of undefeated arguments, which again
means the issue is undecided. Having two sets of rationally approved answers or having
none at all are obviously severe theoretical and practical shortcomings.
The inconsistency budget number can be pragmatically adjusted so as to reduce
or increase the number of rationally acceptable claims in a set of interlocking arguments.
Thus the argument set can be adjusted so as to produce a single rationally approved outcome. In effect, the inconsistency budget removes some attacks by de-weighting them a
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bit. Whether this is more than a technical, pragmatic, intra-system move is a key issue
which is being addressed currently in AI. Dunne’s paper at minimum indicates that
weighting has become recognized as a significant issue area in AI. His proposal to weight
attacks rather than arguments suggests to me an implicit move toward informal logic’s
emphasis on the inherent contextuality of arguments and to the inherently comparative
nature of argument weight. Of course, an informal logician would often want to bring in a
lot more context than just the opposing reasons.
Although it is not practical to address the matter adequately here, it seems to me
that Pollock’s diminishers also signify a step toward viewing argument weighting as essential. Pollock (2009) argues against the normative accrual of arguments, instead arguing that the whole-argument strength on the pro side should be understood as equal to the
strength of the weakest argument in the set of pro arguments for the given conclusion. In
his (2009), John Pollock wrote that “Most of the different theories of defeasible reasoning
differ in their assignments of degrees of justification only in how to handle inference/defeat loops while making the assumption that all degrees of justification are either
0 or 1.” (Italics original). It seems to me that this assumption is questionable and is actually being questioned by an increasing number of AI theorists. We shall return to Pollock
shortly, but briefly, in considering argument accrual below. Extended argumentation
frameworks are a comparatively new development in AI, and it seems to me that they
have significant potential interest and value for theory of argument.
5. SOME TENTATIVE CLAIMS ABOUT ARGUMENT WEIGHT
As mentioned above, a primary goal of the present paper is to encourage a wider acquaintance with AI, and especially AI & Law, within the wider argument theory community. We have covered a lot of ground in a very much ‘overview’ fashion. In the questionanswer format below, the so-called ‘answers’ are intended to function as conversation
starters rather than as purportedly well-grounded views.
5.1 What is argument weight, most basically?
Argument weight is an aspect of sufficiency that minimally involves sorting argument strands
into ranked quantitative categories. Weights are applicable in at least the evaluation of conductive and of analogical arguments. Inductive and deductive arguments can be regarded as
unweighted or equal-weighted, which works out to the same thing because weighing is inherently comparative in nature. Whether there should be a distinction between argument
strength (force) and argument weight is not clear and requires further investigation.
5.2 What are some major components of argument weight?
Argument weight involves importance (applied values) and factors (applied features).
Values might be broadly understood as being either social values or individual preferences, although this distinction may not be adequate or exhaustive. Arguments can address the application of social values, the application of individual preferences, or the
content of social values. But generally arguments do not as often directly address the content of individual preferences, which are subjective and not intersubjective.
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The descriptive and normative interaction of value weightings and feature
weightings is a promising topic for future study. Values may be weighted among themselves; features may be weighted among themselves, either independently of any corresponding value weights or by subdividing each value’s weight among its supporting features. Still other broad types of interactions are imaginable. A single factor may support
more than one value, which adds to the complexity of weighting. The weighting of features is best understood as the degree to which each given feature supports its associated
value or values. For some but not all features, the degree of feature presence is proportional to the feature’s degree of support for the corresponding value.
Due to the limitations my own knowledge of AI, it is not clear to me whether or
not it is acknowledged in AI that a single feature could appropriately belong to two opposing factors. According to Harald Wohlrapp’s concept of reframing (2008: 238), a given circumstance can sometimes be taken as a pro and sometimes as a con factor in a chain
of reasoning. One interpretation of his theory is that a Wohlrappian reframing is basically
a revaluing based on a single feature that supports more than one value, as understood in
Chorley’s treatment of complex dimensions. Insofar as my interpretation of Wohlrapp is
correct, it would seem problematic to develop software to accommodate such a reframing
because a factor is a feature description placed ‘as is’ into a conditional statement.
If one and the same feature can be ‘seen’ in two different ways and thus appear as
a pro and as a con consideration, then the two opposed factors would each have to describe
the given feature using somewhat different descriptive terms. And if this is the case, then a
factor would have to be understood as more than just a feature that is plugged in as the antecedent in a conditional statement form with an outcome, i.e. the ‘side’ favored, as the
consequent. The abstraction level of feature descriptions is likely also an issue here. Walton
(2010) extensively analyzes the issue of abstraction levels for descriptions, and he also in
that paper addresses work in that area by several other AI & Law theorists. Likely a related
issue here is the extent to which the feature/factor distinction as used in AI & Law can be
carried over to the murkier geography of general reasoning and argumentation.
The manner in which values and features interact in argument weight can be
studied empirically through case studies, most obviously in law but potentially more
widely in general argument and argumentation. In such wider framework, a ‘case’ would
be broadly defined as something like ‘the focus of a chain of reasoning’. Such empirical
studies are currently small in number and perhaps nonexistent outside specialty areas
such as legal domains. Computer programs using extended argumentation frameworks in
AI and Law provide a promising direction for better understanding these issues in the
typically high level of complexity found in real-world arguments. The nature of the relevance of such empirical studies to normative issues in theory of argument is far from
clear. Nevertheless, adequate descriptive knowledge is surely essential to effectively
working in normative issues.
5.3 Is argument weight numerical or non-numerical?
Numerical weighting is common in computer applications in the areas of process control and
knowledge engineering. Numerical weights can be used in creating machine models of actual
human reasoning, as we have seen with AI-based theories of the case in civil law contexts in
Great Britain and the US. The theory constructor’s initial selection of specific numerical
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weights is guided by background knowledge of the law; but the initial weightings can be progressively adjusted so as to maximize the retrodictive and predictive success of the theory
constructed. Empirically-based numerical weights are generally domain-based and typically
initially established and adjudicated by experts in specialty areas of knowledge.
Harald Wohlrapp (2008: 333) has seemingly argued that any putative argument
weight, numerical or otherwise, should be understood as originating from subjective individual preferences. Some of those preferences may belong to an institutionalized authority such as a judge, according to Wohlrapp (2008: 334) We thus have in Wohlrapp an opposition between, on the one hand, the numerical/objective and on the other hand the
non-numerical/subjective. We shall leave the subjective-objective distinction to a later
subsection in order to focus on the numerical-related issues.
I have proposed elsewhere (Fischer 2010) that humans use non-numerical quantities in argument weighting. The term ‘non-numerical quantity’ is proposed as the genus
term for the kind of quantity categories for argument strength that appear, for instance, in
Stephen Naylor Thomas’ textbook (1997), which was originally published in 1973.
Thomas uses five categories for argument strength: strong, moderately strong, weak,
moderately weak, and nil. This type of category is sometimes described as ‘qualitative’
in the literature on argument weight because these verbal categories are non-numerical,
but it seems to me that these categories are no more qualitative than are categorical logic’s terms ‘some’, ‘all’, or ‘none’. Also in my (2010), I argue that non-numerical quantities are key to understanding Wellman’s original model of conductive argument weight.
If the terminology of ‘non-numerical quantity’ is accepted, then the heretofore consequential distinction between numerical weight and non-numerical quantitative verbal
weight is reduced to a matter of comparative precision and ease of accrual.
Numerical weights are at home in theories; non-numerical quantitative weights
are at home in everyday human discourse. The dispute over argument weight, numerical
vs. non-numerical, is also somewhat part and parcel of the grand long-term philosophic
dialogue over intelligent systems, consciousness and agency and robotic entities, and so
on. As we have seen, some AI theories can and do apply non-numerical weight categories, our example here being the IBP weight assignments of ‘KO’, ‘normal’, and ‘weak’.
There is likely no way to argue conclusively for having universally any one specific
number of such distinct non-numerical categories rather than another specific number.
IBP has three categories; Thomas has five of them. Intuitively, the number seven for such
categories seems to be a kind of outer limit, with two categories (weak, strong) being the
minimum. The higher limits are likely connected to human cognitive limitations, so expansion by computerization has a certain initial plausibility. It is likely also true that difficulties with the accrual of arguments expand with more non-numerical categories. Argument accrual is addressed in 5.6 ahead.
5.4 What is the relationship between weight, theory, argumentation, and cases?
In order to address this very broad and important question, I would like to bring forward
Harald Wohlrapp’s concept of the theoretical basis of argument. According to Wohlrapp,
the term “theoretical basis” includes theories in science, the humanities, common
knowledge, and some central aspects of theory of argument. Wohlrapp writes:
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The expression "theoretical basis" stands for everything which is (more or less) solid in an
argumentation. So e.g. scientific theories [are included], but also theories in the humanities
and common knowledge. [The theoretical basis] contains also the solid elements of those
parts of arguments which are only admitted and/or claimed (the "thetical" parts). Those solid
elements are e.g. the concepts and the "Topoi". The intention with the concept of the "theoretical basis" is to make a general distinction within the material of an argument: to distinguish those parts which can be used for support from those parts which need to be supported.
(2011; Personal communication)

As I understand him, the ‘thetical’ parts for Wohlrapp are what we must argue to; the
theoretical basis is, in my own phrasing, what we must argue from or with. There is a
Kantian aspect in Wohlrapp in the sense that he attempts to lay out the fundament of argument in a way analogous to Kant’s attempting to lay out the fundament of understanding from which we proceed. I think Wohlrapp makes an important move here in pointing
to the large and intimate role of theory in argument and argumentation.
It seems to me that Wohlrapp’s theoretical basis centers on factual issues and
that values for him are viewed as inherently subjective and personal. Argument weighting
for Wohlrapp (2008: 319) is explicitly identified as subjective and hence non-rational.
Common knowledge for Wohlrapp does not seem to include common values, often called
social values. These points are subject to the same proviso mentioned above that most of
Wohlrapp’s Der Begriff des Arguments has not been translated into English.
In order to more adequately address the issue of values and also argument
weighting, I propose that we add to Wohlrapp’s concept of theoretical basis a second
fundamental concept to be called perhaps the case basis. We have seen in Bench-Capon’s
work how value-based, cased-based reasoning explicitly focuses on social values due to
their justificatory role with respect to positive law. Positive law in some countries, most
notably Britain and the USA, is explicitly case-based. According to Carel E. Smith
(2009), all law is intrinsically case-based to a degree not commonly recognized. Smith’s
argument seems strong to me. The rationale for adding the case basis to general theory of
argument would have to include a defence of the thesis that the concepts of ‘case’ in
‘case-based’ in theory of argument could and should be broadened from the legal context
to the general context. This expansion is here merely suggested and provisional; it needs
a lot more attention elsewhere.
I believe the absence of the case basis in Wohlrapp’s theory may be connected
with his rather sharp distinctions between fact and value and objectivity and subjectivity.
As explicitly shown in case-based legal systems, cases decide values and continually
modify values in a dynamic interchange described as reflective adjustment by Kevin Ashley (2002). I suggest that a process highly similar to value-based, case-based reasoning
determines evolving values in general reasoning. A case basis in this sense consists of a
discourse community’s paradigm cases (in a broadened, non-specialist meaning of ‘case’)
and the values formed by, and forming, those case outcomes. An example of a culture in
which paradigm cases are much more salient than in modern industrial democracies
would be the Classical and Hellenistic Greek cultures. Mythology and parables such as
those of Aesop function to express how certain situations should or should not be resolved and are effectively value statements. Some of the ‘stereotypical situations’ of today’s presumptive logic can also be viewed as having moral import.
Both our common knowledge of fact and our common knowledge of values
seem to me to involve family resemblances rather than universal agreements. Groups and
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cultures generally do not have cognitively explicit and comprehensive statements of their
social values, except in quite limited and incomplete ways. Often, values must be inferred
from observed practices and positive law, which in constitutionally-governed groups expresses values in documents such as the U.S. Bill of Rights. But even documents such as
the Bill of Rights, are not taken to be comprehensive indicators of values. The case-basis,
however, is a fairly comprehensive expression of values, even if it is cognitively unwieldy in obvious ways. It is perhaps a potential impact of Bench-Capon’s theories to
facilitate managing what I am calling the case basis.
Arguments that turn on purely subjective preferences of course commonly occur
and are often unresolvable. For an example of addressing distinct personal preferences in
a context of mutual decision-making, see Bench-Capon’s and Atkinson’s (2009) analysis
of choosing on the train vs. the plane for joint or separate travel to a conference. Values
involved in argumentation are best described as intersubjective, with a family resemblance relationship among those in a social values subscribed to by individuals. Calling
this group the ‘audience’ puts them into a passive position, as compared to using a term
such as ‘respondent’. A jury is a ‘subjective’ element in trial proceeding, but their reasoning in the jury room is not subjective, ideally at least.
5.5 How are individual argument weights rationally determined?
Harald Wohlrapp (2008: 335) has argued against Govier that the concept of argument weight
is subjectively determined and therefore basically non-rational. A major import of the case
basis approach proposed here is that individual argument weights are commonly derived
from the theoretical basis for factual areas and from the case basis for many normative areas.
The case basis varies by individual, group, affiliation, and so forth. But a culture,
and to some extent, the entire world, shares an increasing number of paradigm cases and
associated evolving values. Wohlrapp might argue that cases are what we argue about,
not what we argue with. But the same is often true of theories as well. There is a family
resemblance among widely accepted theories, not a universality; and the same is true,
only less so, with widely accepted paradigm cases. A problem with paradigm cases is that
they are often in the mental background of argument, rather than being brought explicitly
into the rational discussion. Neither the theoretical basis nor the case basis is properly
described as subjective in nature.
A domain-derived weighting could be based on the theoretical basis or on the
case basis or both. It must be admitted parenthetically here that my usage of ‘theoretical
basis’ may have diverge too far from Wohlrapp’s usage for him to be comfortable with it.
If weighing is understood as domain or field dependent, it might still be granted that aspects of argumentation not involving weighting are not field or domain dependent. This
points could offer a partial solution to the very long-term dispute as to the fielddependence, or not, of the theory of argument evaluation.
5.6 Do reasons accrue in conductive arguments?
A chief advantage of numerical argument weights is that the numbers facilitate the accrual of arguments. But since humans rarely use numerical weights in their argumentation,
an additional issue is how to address non-numerical weights in the accrual process. Ap-
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plying the numbers ‘3, 2, 1, 0’ to Stephen Naylor Thomas’ quantitative non-numerical
categories provides a rough and ready method of accrual, but it is hard to see how one
could argue for or against using “3, 2, 1, 0’ vs. ’10, 5, 2, 0’; and the choice of number sets
can provide different evaluations for some arguments.
John Pollock (2001) has famously argued at length that the strength of a group
of arguments should be understood as the strength of the single weakest component argument. In effect, this means that no accrual of arguments is rationally required. I am not
convinced by his argument, although there are aspects of it I cannot claim to understand.
It seems to me that the accrual of arguments has to be understood as an everyday fact and
accepted as a legitimate norm, albeit as yet being only vaguely delineated.
If numerical weights are not provided for non-numerical quantitative categories,
it is hard to see how accrual can work for some arguments. A common method of evaluating conductive arguments is to strike off one strong argument on each side, etc., and
then to assess the accrual outcome by seeing what arguments remain. Perhaps conductive
arguments which cannot be addressed in this way are not rationally decidable as stated.
For example, it may simply be the case that there is no rational evaluation of a conductive
argument with, say, one strong reason pro and nine weak reasons con. Pragmatically,
such arguments are resolved, if at all, by searching for additional relevant reasons or undermining reasons already provided, pro or con. Perhaps what is really needed here is
more empirical studies in order to draw out and describe ‘best practices’, with the criteria
for ‘best’ being developed in terms of some widely shared human basic values such as
reducing avoidable suffering among sentient beings.
5.7 Is machine learning relevant to normative theory of argument?
To some extent at least, humans learn in the same way that intelligent machines learn, i.e.
by experiencing examples and building general patterns from successive examples. Alternatively, both machines and humans can learn not from examples but by taking in rules
directly. The process of machine learning by examples is obviously inductive. It is not
simple induction but rather a complex process, not yet well understood, of constructing a
complex pattern that somehow expresses much of the key commonalty in alreadyexperienced patterns. Pattern recognition is studied widely in AI. With cases understood
as a focus of reasoning, the patterns involved are not physical but rather patterns of reasoning and argument.
The use of argument patterns in case-based reason and argument would seem to
involve a kind of support by logical analogy. The corresponding method in theory construction is a kind of confirmation by logical analogy. As indicated in my (2010) quotation of Pinto:
In his (2001, p. 123), Robert C. Pinto describes the method of logical analogy as “preeminently important.” Pinto further notes: “Though it [argument from logical analogy] is
fairly widely recognized as a method for justifying negative evaluation of arguments and inference, in my view it can also provide grounds for positive evaluations as well.” Govier addresses refutation by logical analogy in her textbook’s chapter on analogical reasoning. I am
not aware of her addressing support by logical analogy elsewhere. (2010: 7)

Both analogical and conductive arguments are case-based in the broader definition of
“case” as being the subject of a unitary rational focus. While human learning is inductive,
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its application is substantially through conductive and analogical argumentation. There is
a sense in which all reality, in terms at least of our cognitive interaction with it, consists
of cases, unless one is a Platonist of some sort.
There is an important sense in which the proposed case basis could be folded
into the theoretical basis. In a joint paper with Giovanni Sartor (2000: 5), Bench Capon
identifies the criteria of normative theory selection as: explanatory power, consistency,
simplicity, and the avoidance of ‘arbitrary’ elements. If one charitably includes empirical
adequacy as a given and also folds Bench-Capon’s non-arbitrariness into simplicity, the
criteria of good theory selection seem similar or identical to those used in selecting good
scientific theories. So it would be accurate in some sense to state that the proposed case
basis deserves a ‘theoretical’ status. Whether this means that the case basis should be
characterized as some kind of subset of the theoretical basis is hard to say, but I would
argue that the case basis is at least worthy of special singling out as a subset of the theoretical basis, if not as a separate basis on its own. The issue at this point is mostly terminological only, once the concept of a case basis is granted.
One other possible advantage of the case basis is that is connects argumentation
to audience. Bench-Capon (2001) has reviewed George Christie’s interesting book, The
Notion of an Ideal Audience in Legal Argument, which seems to me to be a valuable tiein between CBR and issues in theory of argument in its rhetoric-centric approaches.
6. CONCLUSION
Investigating the concept of argument weight has lead us into a number of conceptual
‘gray’ areas involving description and prescription, theories and cases, the subjective and
the objective, and others. The result has had an admittedly ‘piecemeal’ feel to it, but perhaps that is just where we are right now on the subject of argument weight. Working
within such gray-areas can be awkward and even frustrating, but hopefully it can also be
fruitful both in the development of new theory and in adjustments to existing theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fisher’ paper is about the concept of argument weight that has received comparatively
little attention in theory of argument, and is a rich paper that makes one think about a lot
of things. Although detailed and sometimes technical, what he wants to say is not difficult to follow in general terms, and its gist can be summarized rather briefly: Even though
Pinto (2010) is in the right direction on argument weight, his theory of argument weight
seems still “very preliminary”, and can be improved by what theorists in the area of AI
and law have achieved such as Trevor Bench-Capon’s theory of value-based, case-based
reasoning (VCBR). It is with the help of the work of Bench-Capon and others that we can
venture “some tentative claims about argument weight”.
Clearly, the scope of the paper is not restricted to the introduction of the work of
Bench-Capon and others to informal logicians who are interested in the issues about argument weight; it is also concerned with investigating the concept of argument weight
itself. For instance, Fischer states that “the present paper will have achieved much of its
purpose if it helps engender between AI theorists and the broader argument theory community a wider discussion of issues in the topic area of argument weight” (Italics mine).
In the section 5 of the paper, Fisher addresses some key issues about argument weight
that I think are very valuable in stimulating discussion, e.g., is argument weight numerical or non-numerical? Is it legitimate to investigate conductive argument by means of the
achievements in analogical reasoning? In my comments I shall first challenge Fischer’s
assumption that argument weight is an aspect of argument sufficiency, and then expand
some points of Fischer’s view on values involved in argument weight. Finally I shall provide a very tentative account of how argument weight functions under the framework of
argument relevance and sufficiency.
2. ARGUMENT WEIGHT IS NOT AN ASPECT OF ARGUMENT SUFFICIENCY
As Fischer holds, “it is a working assumption of the present paper that argument weight
is a major aspect of argument sufficiency”. In Section 5 he provides us with a definition
of the concept: “Argument weight is an aspect of sufficiency that minimally involves
sorting argument strands into ranked quantitative categories”.

Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition & Community: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the
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Even though some prominent theorists have argued that the ARS approach, taking acceptability, relevance and sufficiency as main criteria for argument evaluation, has
its problems, it is still one of most influential approach to argument evaluation in the field
of informal logic. I appreciate this approach and will take it as a framework of the following discussion. My questions about Fischer’s definition are—why should argument weight
be treated as an aspect of sufficiency? Does it mean that the condition of sufficiency is satisfied if the pros outweigh the cons in a conductive argument? Are there alternative ways to
conceive of argument weight, e.g., defining it in terms of argument relevance?
When talking about principles of conductive reasoning, Wellman (1971: 67-68)
draws a distinction between rules of relevance and rules of force:
In any argument of the third pattern, it is not enough to know whether the premises are or are
not relevant to the conclusion; one must also know how much logical force the reasons for
the conclusion have in comparison to the reasons against the conclusion. To determine the
validity or invalidity of any reasoning from both pros and cons, rules of relevance must be
supplemented by rules of force.

Rules of force are aimed at explaining how to determine whether the pros outweigh the
cons, or whether the pros have greater weight than the cons, so it is reasonable to view
rules of force as being in relation to argument weight. In other words, Wellman seems not
to treat argument weight as an aspect of argument relevance. However, he does not claim
explicitly that argument weight is an aspect of argument sufficiency either.
Pinto does not use the concepts of relevance or sufficiency to address argument
weight. When expounding the steps to be taken in answering questions about the relative
strength of sets of considerations, he (2010: 13) argues:
If neither set outweighs the other, or if the cons outweigh the pros, then the argument fails to
support its conclusion, i.e. fails to support taking a positive attitude toward the conclusion.
Otherwise the argument succeeds—that is to say, supports our taking a positive attitude toward the conclusion.

When Pinto says that if the set of pros outweighs the set of cons the argument succeeds,
he seems to mean that the pros provide sufficient reason for the conclusion. If my reading
is right, Pinto holds here that a conductive argument satisfies the condition of sufficiency
if the pros outweigh the cons, that is, the pros carry greater weight than the cons. At this
point, I think that Pinto might agree with Fischer that argument weight is an aspect of
argument sufficiency.
Unlike Wellman, Pinto and Fischer, Govier deals with argument weight in another
way. In her list of guideline for conductive argument evaluation, Govier (2010: 365 f.) writes:
2. Determine whether the premises offered to support the conclusion are positively
relevant to it, and assess the strength of the reasons.
…
6. If you judge the premises do outweigh the counterconsiderations, you have judged
that the R and G condition are satisfied…

Item 2 is about argument relevance. She seems to think that the strength of the reasons,
that both Pinto and Fischer take as a function of argument weight, can be determined in
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terms of argument relevance, but she does not tell us how to do it. 1 In item 6 Govier
claims that if the pros do outweigh the cons both relevance condition and good grounds
(or sufficiency) condition are satisfied. That is to say, she appears to maintain that both
argument sufficiency and argument relevance are involved in argument weight. However,
she does not explain how both conditions function in the process of judging that the pros
carry greater weight than the cons.
Based upon Govier’s approach to argument weight, I think that argument weight
is better defined in terms of argument relevance. Let us look at an example first:
Even though 15% of the faculty of East China Normal University (ECNU) complains that
working at a new campus will inevitably result in an increase in their transportation time and
costs, the authority of ECNU still prefers to construct a new campus because 85% of the faculty does not think that they will spend more time and money on transportation if working at
that proposed new campus.

This argument involves both a pro and a con. Following the line of thought of VCBR
theory, according to the principle of majority, it is reasonable to assign greater weight to
the pro; therefore it is also reasonable to judge that the pro outweighs the con.
If argument weight is indeed an aspect of argument sufficiency, can we say justifiably that in the above argument the pro provides sufficient reason for the conclusion?
My answer is “No”, because in this case the arguer neglects some considerations such as
the necessity of constructing a new campus, the size of the proposed new campus, the
costs of construction of the proposed new campus, the financial conditions of the university. As far as the problem at issue is concerned, these considerations are usually highly
relevant, or bear greater weight, or are more significant, than those mentioned. In my
view, only the arguer takes into account the positively relevant considerations or considerations with greater weight as many as possible and judges the pros do have greater
weights than the cons can he judge reasonably that the pros give sufficient reason for the
conclusion. Since the condition of sufficiency might not be satisfied in a conductive argument even though the pros have greater weight than the cons, it is still inconclusive
that argument weight is an aspect of argument sufficiency.
But how can we interpret argument weight from a viewpoint of argument relevant? I find it is very illuminating that Govier relates argument weight to argument relevance through the concept of significance. She (2010: 355-356) points out:
If an arguer explicitly acknowledges counterconsiderations but nevertheless still claims that
her conclusion is supported by positively relevant premises, she is judging that her positively
relevant premises outweigh the counterconsiderations. Obviously, the term outweigh here is
metaphorical; it expresses the idea that the positively relevant factors are more significant, or
count for more, than the negatively relevant factors. (Italics original)

In my view, Govier’s idea could be interpreted as follows: a pro outweighs a con in a conductive argument, or a pro bears greater weight than a con if and only if the pro is more

1

According to Govier (1999: 170), “We commit ourselves to the judgement that, on balance, the pros
outweighs the cons, and do so to a sufficient degree that there are good grounds for the conclusion.”
(Italics original) Here she seems to hold that the outweighing of the pros over the cons is equal to that
the pros provide sufficient reason to the conclusion.
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relevant to the conclusion than the con; and the pro is more relevant to the conclusion than
the con if and only if the pro is more significant for supporting the conclusion than the con.
Clearly this interpretation presupposes an idea of the degrees of argument relevance. In Johnson and Blair (2006: xiv), they holds that the concept of relevance can be
understood in two ways:
If the concept of relevance designates the weight of the support, then it comes in degrees…On the other hand, if the concept of relevance designates the idea of having bearing
on the truth of the claim at issue, then relevance is an “on/off” concept, for a premise either is
relevant in this sense or it isn’t…We would now say that a premise in an argument (always in
combination with the other premises) either has probative relevance to (i.e., bearing on) the
conclusion or it does not. If it does have probative relevance, then the weight of that relevance will belong somewhere in the range between very weak relevance at one extreme and
decisive relevance at the other. (Italics original)

Taking Johnson and Blair’s view as the starting point, I think the relevance of considerations to the conclusion can first be divided into three ranked categories: positive relevance, irrelevance and negative relevance, according to whether those considerations
have bearing on, or have no relationship to, or count against, the truth or acceptability of
the conclusion. Then, the positive relevance can be further rated in terms of the degrees of
significance of the pros for supporting the conclusion. The same is true of the negative relevance: it can also be graded on the basis of the degrees of significance of the cons for undermining the conclusion. Thus we can attach ranked categories of weight to the pros and
the cons in terms of the degrees of relevance of those considerations to the conclusion.
3. VALUES INVOLVED IN ARGUMENT WEIGHT
Wellman and Govier have used the term “weight” in their discussion of conductive argument, but neither defined it nor accounted for the components of argument weight.
Based upon the achievements made by Pinto and theorists in AI and Law, Fischer holds
that “Argument weight involves importance (applied values) and factors (applied features)” (Italics original). Considering that Fischer himself describes his claims as “conversation starters rather than as purportedly well-grounded views”, in this section I shall
address some questions about his view of values involved in argument weight.
First, values involved in argument weight, according to Fischer, “might be
broadly understood as being either social values or individual preferences.” As he points
out, “this distinction may not be adequate.” (Italics original) If one asks why Fischer
tends to limit values to social values and individual preferences, I guess the reason might
be that he addresses argument weight mainly on the basis of the theory of VCBR. In fact,
conductive arguments are not only prominent in areas such as law, politics and ethics
where people make decisions about what to do, but also used to interpret human behaviour, historical events, or literary texts, and even needed at the very core of scientific theorizing. One reason for my claiming that Fisher’s distinction is inadequate is that some
values involved in argument weight are neither social values nor individual preferences,
but epistemic values. Let us look at an example provided by Govier (2010: 354). According to her, to argue that a proposed explanatory hypothesis is better than its alternatives
one needs to argue that it is more plausible, simpler, and has greater explanatory power.
The argument about this case is a conductive one because there are distinct aspects relevant
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to the merits of a scientific hypothesis. It is clear that the weighting of those aspects is determined by a set of epistemic values, such as the plausibility, the simplicity and the explanatory power of a scientific hypothesis, neither social values nor individual preferences. 2
Another reason for my claim is that argument weight may not involve values,
either social values or epistemic values or individual preferences, but relates to a set of
criteria. There is an example in Wellman (1971: 54): Although John can play only one
instrument, and that not very well, he is still musical because he has a remarkable
memory for music he has heard and composes upon occasion. In this example a factual
conclusion about some individual case—whether or not John is musical—is drawn from
information about that case. There are some factors independently relevant to the conclusion, and they do bear different degrees of weight of the support for the conclusion. In my
view, the weighting of those factors are not determined by a set of values but a set of criteria for identifying a person to be musical. In this case, it is the priority of those criteria
that sort the weight of those factors into different ranked categories.
Second, how can we decide the values and their priority needed for the
weighting of factors in a case? According to Fischer’s account of the theory of VCBR,
different cases may need different sets of values for determining argument weight. The
selection of values is typically case-based or domain-based and adjudicated by common
sense or experts in special areas of knowledge. In the theory of VCBR, the priority of
values seems more important for ranking the weight of factors. When addressing the issue of how to assign weight to factors, Fisher mentions rule preference and value preference of the theory of VCBR, and holds that both preferences are rankings and could be
regarded as the precursor of weighting or the first level of weighting. But he does not go
into detail about the issues such as: where are rule preference and value preference derived from? Which is fundamental, rule preference or value preference? How do rule
preference, value preference and factors interact in determining argument weight?
Third, when talking about his own view about values involved in argument
weight, Fischer puts stress on the distinction between the intersubjectivity of social values
and the pure subjectivity of individual preferences, and believes that both values and argument weight can be intersubjective even though values are case-based or domain-based.
However, he seems overoptimistic about that the entire world shares an increasing number of paradigm cases and associated evolving values. To my mind, Fischer neglects the
fact that even if different cultures can share one and the same set of values, the priority of
those values may probably be different among those cultures. Accordingly, when dealing
with the same case, different cultures may probably sort the same factor into different categories of weight on the basis of different understandings of the priority of the same set of
values. Considering the inevitability of the culture-dependence of values and the priority of
values, in the final analysis, argument weight still cannot escape from the undergoing dispute with regard to the field-dependence and field-invariance of argumentation evaluation.

2

Pinto (2010: 14) has noticed that when Zenker (2010) speaks of the weight of considerations he appears
to have in mind values other than purely epistemic values.
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4. ARGUMENT WEIGHT, RELEVANCE AND SUFFICIENCY CONDITIONS
In this section I want to briefly venture the question of how argument weight functions under the framework of argument relevance and sufficiency, the second and third of informal
logic’s argument evaluation triad of ARS (Acceptability, Relevance and Sufficiency).
Although Pinto does not relate argument weight to argument relevance and sufficiency, his theory of argument weight is still a suitable starting point for the following
discussion. According to Pinto (2010: 18),
The weight of a consideration would be a function of (a) the extent or degree to which a criterion has been satisfied and (b) the importance of that criterion. And the overall force of any
consideration would be a function of the weight of the consideration and the risk involved in
relying on that consideration.

Following Fischer, I will not go into detail about the issues concerning the concepts of risk,
importance, degree of feature presence, etc. I agree with him that Chorley’s system, based
in most respects on Bench-Capon’s account of VCBR provides some improvement on Pinto’s idea of argument weight. For example, according to Chorley, what Pinto calls importance should be better understood as involving values which are ranked and thus
weighted in some way. Based upon Pinto’s account of argument weight and Chorley’s system, Fischer develops his own understanding of argument weight: (a) it is an aspect of argument sufficiency and (b) involves importance (applied values) and factors (applied features).
In the above sections, I have argued that argument weight should be better
viewed as relating to argument relevance and expanded Fischer’s the concept of values,
into which epistemic values and criteria are included. In the rest of this section, I will
venture a very preliminary account of how argument weight functions under the framework of argument relevance and sufficiency. The basic ideas are as follows:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

The weight (W) of a feature (F) of one case is determined by values/criteria
(V/C) involved in that case.
Both the selection of V/C and the priority of V/C are decided either in a priori
ways (conceptual analysis of that case) or in empirical ways (descriptive studies
of similar cases).
In general, Fi usually has corresponding V/Ci, or V/Ci always corresponds to Fi.
Wi of Fi is an indicator of the degree of the relevance of Fi to that case. Put it
another way, Wi of Fi would be a function of (a) the degree to which V/Ci has
been satisfied and (b) the significance of V/Ci.
Suppose that F1 corresponding to V/C1 has W1, F2 corresponding to V/C2 has W2.
If V/C1 takes precedence over or is more significant than V/C2, F1 is more
relevant to that case than F2; accordingly, W1 is greater than W2.
Suppose that both F1 and F2 correspond to V/C1, F1 satisfies V/C1 to degree D1,
and F2 satisfies V/C1 to degree D2. If D1 is greater than D2, F1 is more relevant
than F2; accordingly, W1 of F1 is greater than W2 of F2.
Suppose that F1 corresponds to both V/C1 and V/C2. If V/C1 is more significant
than V/C2, F1 relating to V/C1 (F1-V/C1 in abbreviation) is more relevant than F1
relating to V/C2 (F1-V/C2); accordingly, W1 of F1-V/C1 is greater than W2 of F1-V/C2.
The weight of Fi or the degree of the relevance of Fi belongs in the range
between negative relevance and positive relevance. The degree of positive or
6
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(9)

negative relevance itself varies from very weak relevance at one extreme to
decisive relevance at the other.
Suppose that an argument about that case involves both PRO (=features being
positively relevant to a claim K) and CON (=features being negatively relevant
to K). The sufficiency of PRO for K would be a function of (a) the quantity of
individual PRO and (b) the weight of individual PRO and (c) that the collective
weight of PRO outweighs the collective weight of CON. That is, the more individual PROs are considered and the greater the weight of individual PRO bears,
plus the outweighing of PRO over CON, the greater the degree of sufficiency of
PRO for K is.
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